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Lightner: Winds of Change are Blowing from the Obama NLRB

WINDS OF CHANGE ARE BLOWING FROM THE
OBAMA NLRB
J. Michael Lightner*
With the swearing-in of Republican Brian Hayes as the newest
Member of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")
on June 29, 2010, the five-member Board was brought back to full
strength for the first time since December 2007. However, the full
strength status was short lived. Barely two months later, the Board was
down to four members when Member Peter C. Schaumber's term
expired in late August. Thus, the Obama Board now consists of three
Democrats and one Republican. Even if Mr. Schaumber is replaced with
another Republican, the Democratic majority may revisit a number of
George W. Bush Board decisions that favor employers and take a more
employee-friendly approach to their decisions. Four separate decisions
issued on August 27, 2010 seem to confirm this expectation.
As discussed below, the difference in the Barack Obama Board's
approach from that of the Bush Board may be observed in two ways: (1)
the Board is inviting comment on Bush Board legal holdings as to
whether they should be endorsed, reversed, or modified; and (2) longstanding NLRB legal principles are being applied to the facts of a case in
a significantly different manner than would have occurred under the
Bush Board.
Two of the August 27, 2010 decisions fall into the first categoryLamons Gasket Co.' and UGL-UNICCO Service Co.2 In the Lamons
Gasket Co. decision, the Board granted review of a Regional Director's
Decision and Direction of Election.3 The Director applied the Bush
Board's Dana Corp.4 decision to find that there was no recognition bar
*

Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board, Region 22 (Newark, New Jersey).
1. 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (Aug. 27, 2010). Rite Aid Store #6473, the main employer in the
decision, has withdrawn its Request for Review by the Board. However, the Rite Aid decision is a
consolidation of two Request for Review cases, so the decision will now be known by the name of
the second employer, Lamons Gasket Company.
2. 355 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Aug. 27, 2010).
3. Lamons Gasket Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, slip op. at 1.
4. 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).

163

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 6

164

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:163

to the filing of the underlying petition.s In so doing, the Board indicated
it was considering whether to reverse or modify the Dana holding and
return to the Keller Plastics recognition-bar doctrine.6 Keller Plastics
had been in place for decades prior to the Dana decision.7 It held that
whenever an employer voluntarily recognizes a union as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of its employees, the union enjoys
an irrebuttable presumption of majority support among those employees
for a "reasonable period of time" following such recognition.8 Prior to
Dana, the Board consistently held that the legitimate voluntary
recognition of a union constituted a bar to filing representation petitions
during the Keller Plastics "reasonable period of time" following
recognition.9 The Dana decision significantly altered the recognitionbar doctrine. It required that upon the grant of recognition, the employer
must post a notice to employees for forty-five days informing them of
the recognition, and that there would be no recognition bar to any
petitions filed within the forty-five day period.o Only after the
expiration of the forty-five day posting period without a petition being
filed will a recognition bar attach.'1 In the Lamons Gasket Co. decision,
the Board did not actually reverse or modify Dana, but it invited the
parties and amici to submit briefs as to whether it should do so. 12 The
Board asked that the submissions address several issues relating to the
filer's experience under Dana: whether the application of Dana has
furthered or hindered employees' representation choices, whether Dana
has furthered or hindered collective bargaining, whether Dana should
apply to recognition of an incumbent union for newly acquired or
merged facilities, whether substantial compliance should be sufficient to
satisfy the Dana notice-posting requirements and if the Board reverses
or modifies Dana, whether it should do so retroactively or prospectively
only. 13
UGL-UNICCO Service Co. is another decision in the category of
5. See Lamons Gasket Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, slip op. at 1.
6. See id The Keller Plastics recognition-bar doctrine establishes that parties can rely on the
representative status of a voluntarily recognized union for a reasonable period of time. Keller
Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1996).
7. See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 437 (acknowledging that the recognition-bar doctrine
was established in Keller Plastics in 1966-forty-one years before the DanaCorp. decision).
8. Keller Plastics, 157 N.L.R.B. at 587.
9. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 1262,1263 (1975).
10. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 442-43.
11. See id. at 441.
12. Lamons Gasket Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
13. Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Lamons Gasket Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (2010)
(No. 31-RD-1578).
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cases in which the Obama Board is revisiting a Bush Board holding.
There, the Board granted review of a Regional Director's Decision and
Direction of Election as to whether it should reverse or modify MV
4
Transportation.1
MV Transportation had previously reversed the
successor bar doctrine." Under that doctrine, as set forth in St. Elizabeth
Manor, Inc.,16 once a successor employer's obligation to recognize an
incumbent union has attached, the union is entitled to the same
"reasonable period of time" established in the Keller Plasticsdecision.
During this time, the union's presumption of majority support is
MV
irrebuttable and representation petitions are barred.18
Transportation reversed St. Elizabeth Manor, holding that recognition
by a successor employer establishes only a rebuttable presumption of
majority support and does not bar the filing of any petitions.19 In UGLUNICCO, the Board did not rule on the viability of MV Transportation,
but similar to its Lamons Gasket Co. procedure, solicited briefs from the
parties and amici as to whether it should do so.2 0
Before moving on, it is worth noting that to the extent the Obama
Board is inclined to revisit Bush Board decisions with which it may
disagree, there is a significant difference as to how quickly it would be
able to do so. Specifically, there is a difference between cases arising as
representation case ("RC") issues, and those involving unfair labor
practice ("ULP") issues. Procedurally, the only way a ULP issue can
come before the Board is through a finding by a Regional Director that
the ULP allegations have merit and a ULP complaint is issued. In this
regard, Regional Directors are bound to apply existing Board law in
deciding the merits of ULP allegations, unless and until, a current Board
changes that law. Most of the Bush Board ULP decisions found that
certain employer conduct does not constitute a ULP. As long as those
decisions remain valid, Regional Directors will be dismissing ULP
allegations, not issuing complaints. Dismissals may be appealed only to
the NLRB General Counsel, not the Board. 2 1 Therefore, in order for any
of these ULP issues to get before the Board, the General Counsel will
have to decide to grant appeals of these dismissals and authorize
14. 337 N.L.R.B. 770 (2002); UGL-UNICCO Serv. Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 155, slip op. at I
(Aug. 27, 2010).
15. See MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. at 770.
16. 329 N.L.R.B. 341 (1999).
17. See id. at 344; Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1996).
18. St. Elizabeth Manor, 329 N.L.R.B. at 346.
19. MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. at 770.
20. See UGL-UNICCO Serv. Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 155, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
21. See id.
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complaints which seek to reverse a Bush Board holding. The General
Counsel could also decide on his or her own to place an issue before the
Board by requiring Regional Directors to submit all cases raising that
issue to the Office of the General Counsel so that the General Counsel
can select one to use as the vehicle for Board consideration. Since these
scenarios involve sensitive policy and political concerns, it remains to be
seen whether-and if so, how quickly-the current Acting General
Counsel will be inclined to act.22
RC cases, on the other hand, are non-adversarial proceedings in
which issues are resolved through the issuance of a written Decision of
the Regional Director. RD Decisions are directly reviewable by the
Board upon request by any party. So, even though the Director must
continue to apply Bush Board holdings when deciding an issue, any
party may test the holding through seeking Board review-as was done
in both the Lamons Gasket Co. and UGL-UNICCO cases. Accordingly,
I would expect that the Bush Board decisions most likely to come under
scrutiny by the Obama Board in the near future will be limited to the
numerous RC issues.
The other two August 27, 2010 decisions for consideration herein
are in the second category described above: cases which do not involve
possible changes in existing Board law but only how the law is applied
to similar sets of facts. The first case is Kiewit Power Constructors Co. 23
Here, the issue was whether employees who were discharged while
engaged in protected concerted activity lost that protection by engaging
in misconduct in the course of the protected activity. 24 The employer
was a construction company building turbines and other structures at a
power plant.25 For a period of time the electricians working on the site,
who were represented by an electrical workers' union, were permitted to
take fifteen minute breaks in the morning and afternoon.2 6 The workers
22. In June 2010, former General Counsel Ron Meisburg resigned and was replaced
temporarily by an Acting General Counsel, Lafe Solomon. Press Release, NLRB, Veteran NLRB
Attorney Lafe Solomon Named Acting General Counsel (June 20, 2010), available at
Mr. Solomon will serve as
http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/Press%20Releases/2010/R-2753.pdf
Acting General Counsel indefinitely pending the nomination and confirmation of a new General
Counsel by the President. No such nomination has yet been announced.
23. 355 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Aug. 27, 2010).
24. See Kiewit, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 150, slip op. at 1. The National Labor Relations Act states,
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (2006).
25. Kiewit, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 150, slip op. at 1.
26. Id.
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were allowed to leave the construction area and take their breaks in
trailers known as "dry shacks." 27 As the construction progressed to the
upper floors, the time it took the employees to get to and from the dry
shacks increased such that, eventually, this practice resulted in twentyfive to thirty minutes of downtime per break.28 Eventually, the employer
decided to require that the breaks be taken in place at their workstations
to limit the break periods to the intended fifteen minutes.29 The
employees objected to this change and continued to take their breaks in
the dry shacks. 3 0 The employer responded by informing them that they
would be disciplined if they continued to take breaks in the dry shacks.'
The next day, several crews ignored the admonition and took their
breaks in the dry shacks. 32 Upon observing this conduct the employer
prepared warnings for those employees and sent a manager to deliver
them to the employees at their work stations.33 Present at one of the
workstations was a crew of several employees, including the two
After the warnings were distributed a crew
employees at issue.
member asked if they would be written up again if they repeated their
conduct during the afternoon break. When the manager responded in
the affirmative, the first employee stated in an angry tone that he had
been out of work for a year and that "it was going to get ugly" if he were
terminated and that the manager had "better bring his boxing gloves." 36
The second employee chimed in that he, too, had been out of work and
"it was going to get ugly."37 Both employees were terminated the
following day for threatening the manager and others with physical
-38
violence.
The Board determined that the applicable legal standard is that of
the thirty-one-year-old decision in Atlantic Steel Co. 39 to determine
whether employee misconduct that occurs during the course of otherwise
protected activity is "so opprobrious" as to lose the protection of the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979).
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National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). 4 0 That decision
established a four-factor test to determine whether an employee has
engaged in misconduct. 4 1 The factors include: (1) the place of the
discussion, (2) the subject matter of the discussion, (3) the nature of the
employee's outburst, and (4) whether the outburst was provoked by the
employer's unfair labor practice.4 2 A determination must be made for
each factor as to whether it favors or does not favor protection of the
conduct.4 3 In applying this test, the Board majority, consisting of
Chairman Wilma B. Liebman and Member Mark Gaston Pearce, found
that as to the first factor, the employees' remarks were made in a work
area and obviously heard by other employees.4 4 While under some
circumstances this would weigh against protection, the majority found
that since it was the employer who chose to deliver the warnings in a
group setting in a work area, such that it should reasonably have
expected that employees would react and protest on the spot, the
employer cannot complain that other employees witnessed the event.45
Therefore, the Board found that application of the first factor favored
protection or, at least, was neutral.46 As to the second factor, the
majority found that this factor weighed in favor of protection because
the subject matter-the employees' protest over the use of discipline to
enforce a material change in working conditions by altering the break
policy-was clearly protected activity. 4 7
The most difficult analysis was that involving the third factor, the
nature of the outburst. The majority itself refers to drawing a line
between cases in which employees engaged in concerted activity "that
exceed the bounds of lawful conduct in a moment of animal exuberance
[and] . . . flagrant cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such

a character as to render the employee unfit for service." 48 The majority
proceeded to find that the employees' remarks fell "short of the kind of
unambiguous physical threat" that would cross the line. 4 9 They found
that the remarks were "single, brief, and spontaneous reactions,"
unaccompanied by any threatening gestures and capable of interpretation
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Kiewit, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 150, slip op. at 2 (citing Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816).
See Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816.
Id
See id.
Kiewit, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 150, slip op. at 2.
Id.

46. Id.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 3 (citing Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 51, 51-52 (1973)).
Id. at3.
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as merely figures of speech suggesting the filing of grievances or a labor
dispute.s0 The Board concluded that the nature of the outburst was, at
least, ambiguous and could not be construed as unprotected physical
threats.5 ' This factor weighed in favor of protection.52
As for the fourth factor of provocation, the Board found that,
inasmuch as "the conduct . . . was not provoked by an unfair labor

The majority
practice," this factor weighed against protection.53
concluded that, having found that only one of the four factors weighed
against protection, the employees' conduct did not lose its protection,
and the discharges were unlawful. 4
In pointed contrast, Member Schaumber strongly disagreed. In his
dissent, he focused almost entirely on the third factor-the nature of the
He had no trouble finding the remarks to be completely
conduct.
unambiguous threats of physical harm by not only relying on the words
themselves, but also on the testimony that the manager felt threatened
with violence (which the majority found to be an irrelevant subjective
He also referred to the current business climate in which
perception).
must
adopt zero-tolerance policies towards conduct which
employers
may threaten or lead to violence, and he found that the employees'
remarks could reasonably be interpreted to fall into that category.57 As
Member Schaumber's views were usually shared by the majority of the
Bush Board, I believe it is clear that the Bush Board would have found
this conduct to be clearly on the other side of the line described in the
Prescott decision.
Finally, the other case which reflects differing interpretations of
existing law is the decision in E.I. DuPont Be Nemours, Louisville
Works. 8 This is a Section 8(a)(5) case.59 The issue was whether an
employer's unilateral change to the employees' health insurance plan
was privileged because the union had waived its right to notice and
bargaining through past practice.60 The employer and the union were
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 3-4.
55. See id. at 6 (Schaumber, dissenting).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 5.
58. 355 N.L.R.B. No. 176, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 27, 2010).
59. Id. at 1. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA states that it is unlawful for an employer to "refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
60. E.I DuPont, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 176, slip op. at 1.
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parties to successive collective bargaining agreements that provided
employees with a Beneflex Plan under which the employer provided
health care and other benefits. 6 1 "The parties incorporated the Beneflex
Plan, which included a reservation of rights provision granting the
[employer the right] to modify benefits ... on an annual basis, into their
. . agreements."62 The employer unilaterally exercised this right
without union objection during the terms of successive contracts from
1994 until the expiration of a contract in 2002.63 "Following expiration
of the [contract] in . . . 2002, and while the parties were negotiating a
successor agreement, the [employer] continued . . . to make unilateral

changes to the Beneflex Plan."6 The Union objected, asserting that in
the absence of a current contract, the employer had to bargain before
making the changes. The employer refused to do so, "citing its past
practice of making such unilateral changes under the reservation of
rights clause." 66 The Board majority, consisting of Chairman Liebman
and Member Craig Becker, agreed with the union and found the
employer's unilateral changes violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 67
In finding that there was no past practice sufficient to establish that
the union had waived its right to bargain, the majority distinguished this
situation from the Courier-Journal" decisions.6 9 In those cases, there
was a past practice of union acquiescence in unilateral changes made
both during a contract's term and during hiatus periods. 70 In E.I.
DuPont, there was no past practice of permitting unilateral changes
during any hiatus periods; the past practice was limited only to changes
The majority
made during periods when a contract was in effect.'
found the reservations of rights provision in the Beneflex Plan to be the
functional equivalent of a contractual management rights clause.72 To
extend the "Courier-Journaldecisions to [this] situation . . . would

conflict with settled law that a management-rights clause does not
survive the expiration" of collective bargaining agreements.7 3 The
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
342
See
See
See
See
Id.

id.
N.L.R.B. 1148 (2004); 342 N.L.R.B 1093 (2004).
E.I. DuPont, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 176, slip op. at 1-2.
Courier-Journal, 342 N.L.R.B. at 1094; Courier-Journal, 342 N.L.R.B at 1148.
E. DuPont, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 176, slip op. at 1-2.
id. at 2.
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majority notes, in response to Member Schaumber's dissent, that a
management rights clause is simply a contractual provision granting the
employer the right to act unilaterally with respect to mandatory subjects
for bargaining.7 4 It does not matter whether such rights are expressed as
a free-standing term of an agreement or as a component of another term,
Either way, such provisions operate as waivers of
as in this case.
and, as such, have no effect in the absence of a
rights
to
bargain
unions'
contract unless a past practice of giving them effect in between contracts
exists.
As noted, there is a vigorous dissent by Member Schaumber. He
rejects the notion that the reservation of rights language in the Beneflex
Plan is akin to a management rights clause. 76 While not disputing-or
even disagreeing with-the majority's statement of applicable legal
principles, he argues that the majority has applied the Courier-Journal
holding too narrowly.77 The reservation of rights provision is not a
separate term of the contract, but instead an essential component of the
Beneflex Plan only. The union agreed to the component when inclusion
of the plan was initially agreed upon. Thus, it is part of the status quo
for the employees' benefit plan, and the right to make unilateral changes
at any time is a part of that status quo.79 It is not dependent on the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement.o Member Schaumber
states:
Further, in contrast to management-rights clauses which cover subjects
not otherwise dealt with in the contract, the reservation of rights clause
in the Beneflex Plan is itself a part of the benefits plan to which the
parties agreed contractually. The [employer] and the Union struck a
deal, under which unit employees would receive the benefits provided
under the Plan, subject to the Plan's terms and conditions, one of
which is the [employer's] reservation of a right to make changes to the
Plan..

.

. The [employer] never agreed to provide benefits under the

Plan uncoupled from a unilateral right to make changes therein. 81

It appears from this statement that Member Schaumber believes
that the issue of a past practice is irrelevant. The reservation of rights
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id.
Id
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language is merely one component of the Plan and does not exist
independently from it. Therefore, since the Plan survives the expiration
of the agreement as a term and condition of employment, the reservation
of rights provision in the plan also survives.
However, he does proceed to discuss the issue of past practice and
asserts that the majority misinterpreted and incorrectly limited the
holding of the Courier-Journaldecisions.8 2 He argues that those cases
should be read to mean that once the parties by their actions have created
a "past practice authorizing an employer's unilateral action," that past
practice becomes the status quo for the action affected.8 3 Further, until
changed by the parties, past practice remains in effect at all times
regardless of whether or not a contract is in effect.84
Finally, the dissent expands its reasoning broadly to incorporate a
discussion of the "big picture." It asserts that dismissal of the complaint
is consistent with current economic realities facing large companies and
their need to address the pension, health, and welfare needs of all
employees, both represented and unrepresented.85
The majority's
86
holding, the dissent argues, would create chaos. It would require a
large employer to "freeze in place, unit by unit as contracts expire and
successor agreements are not immediately concluded, extant benefit-plan
terms at the moment of expiration, creating a checkerboard of plans,"
driving up costs and causing employers to simply stop offering such
plans to represented employees. Member Schaumber expressed similar
social and economic commentary in his dissent in the Kiewit case:
An unfortunate development of our times has been the escalation and
severity of workplace violence and the proliferation of litigation
flowing from such incidents. Behavior that might once have been
accepted as part of the "rough and tumble" of labor relations must now
be viewed through a different lens by employers confronted with the
task of protecting both the safety of their employees and the corporate
fisc against protracted and expensive lawsuits alleging a host of claims
from negligent supervision and hiring to hostile work environments.88

82.
83.

See id at 7.
Id.

84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id
87. Id.
88. Kiewit Power Constructors Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 150, slip op. at 5 (Aug. 27, 2010)
(Schaumber, dissenting).
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Member Schaumber's "macro" approach in these two decisions, in
which he seems to be expressing sympathy for the impact of external
forces on employer decision-making, stands in contrast to the majority's
preference to focus on the protection of employees' rights in their
workplaces. Interestingly, Chairman Liebman, in supporting the call for
labor law reform in recent years, has noted that the Act has remained
unchanged in any meaningful way for decades. 89 She expressed the
view that reform was needed, at least in part, because of major changes
in the workplace and the U.S. economy from many years ago. 90 I would
note, however, that her remarks have been with regard to the need for
legislative changes to the Act and, therefore, do not necessarily mean
that she agrees with Member Schaumber's view that external, real world
concerns should play a role in deciding individual cases.

89. Susan J. McGlorick, Chairman Liebman Tells ABA She Hopes Board Will Take a More
DynamicApproach, 41 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-I (Mar. 3, 2009)).
90. Id.
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